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Protecting Public Lands from the Public: Kane
County and Revised Statute 2477
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1866, Congress passed Revised Statute 2477 (“R.S. 2477”).1
This Reconstruction-era statute granted a “right of way for the
construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public
uses,”2 to encourage the development and construction of highways
on public lands.3 The statute was an open-ended grant and did not
require any action by local governments—or the federal
government—to establish a valid right-of-way.4 Thus, it became
difficult—if not impossible—to track valid R.S. 2477 rights-of-way.5
In 1976, Congress passed the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”), which repealed R.S. 2477.6 But FLPMA
preserved R.S. 2477 rights-of-way established before 1976.7
Recently, in Wilderness Society v. Kane County,8 the validity and
scope of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way came into question after Kane
County passed an ordinance allowing off-highway vehicle (“OHV”)
use on certain county roads located within Grand Staircase-Escalante
National Monument (“Grand Staircase-Escalante”). This Note will
address the weaknesses in the Wilderness Society opinion, including
the Tenth Circuit’s decision to grant standing to private third-party

1. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735, 740 (10th Cir. 2005).
2. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 932,
repealed by Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 702, 90
Stat. 2743, 2787 (1976).
3. See U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, BLM
Administrative Determinations on R.S. 2477 Rights-of-Way, http://www.blm.gov/ut/st/
en/prog/more/lands_and_realty/rs2477_rights-of-way.print.html (last visited Feb. 27,
2010).
4. 43 C.F.R. § 244.55 (1938).
5. Michael J. Wolter, Comment, Revised Statutes 2477 Rights-of-Way Settlement Act:
Exorcism or Exercise for the Ghost of Land Use Past?, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 315, 319
(1996).
6. Federal Land Policy Management Act § 702.
7. “Nothing in this Act . . . shall be construed as terminating any valid . . . right-of-way
. . . existing on the date of the approval of this Act.” Id. § 701(a). “All actions by the Secretary
concerned under this Act shall be subject to valid existing rights.” Id. § 701(h).
8. 581 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2009).
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plaintiffs under the Supremacy Clause9 and to ignore Kane County’s
R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. In particular, Part V will explain the pitfalls
of the majority opinion by showing that the majority failed to
adequately address Kane County’s vested rights in R.S. 2477 roads
and, in so doing, erred when it held that any county ordinance
allowing OHVs in contradiction to federal management plans is
preempted under the Supremacy Clause.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
There are more than 1.6 million acres of federal public land
within Kane County, Utah.10 Most of the public land in Kane
County lies within Grand Staircase-Escalante.11 Grand StaircaseEscalante was created on September 18, 1996, by former President
Bill Clinton.12 It encompasses 2700 square miles of land, in two
Utah counties, equaling the size of Delaware and Rhode Island
combined.13 Or, stated in different terms, Grand Staircase-Escalante
is equal “to a one-and-a-half mile wide tract of land stretching from
San Francisco to New York City.”14 Since Grand Staircase-Escalante
was created, Kane County has fought to have a voice in the
management of these public lands.15 Wilderness Society represents the
most recent litigation in this ongoing fight.
The struggle in Wilderness Society began in 2000 when the
Department of the Interior approved a management plan for Grand
Staircase-Escalante.16 This plan prohibited OHV travel on many
roads within Grand Staircase-Escalante, but recognizing the
9. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
10. Wilderness Soc’y, 581 F.3d at 1205.
11. Id.
12. Grand Staircase/Escalante National Monument, http://www.nationalpark
reservations.com/grand-staircase-escalante-national-park.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
13. Eric C. Rusnak, Comment, The Straw that Broke the Camel’s Back? Grand StaircaseEscalante National Monument Antiquates the Antiquities Act, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 671
(2003) (citing Matthew W. Harrison, Legislative Delegation and Presidential Authority: The
Antiquities Act and the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument—A Call for a New
Judicial Examination, 13 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 409, 410 (1998)).
14. Id. (citing Statement of Michael E. Noel, Chairman Kane County Resource
Development Committee, The National Monument Fairness Act of 2001: Hearing on H.R.
2114 Before the House Comm. on Res., Subcomm. on Nat. Parks, Recreation, and Pub. Lands,
107th Cong. 50–55 (2001)).
15. See, e.g., Highway Robbery: Utah’s Lands at Risk, http://www.highwayrobbery.com/lands/utah13.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
16. Wilderness Soc’y, 581 F.3d at 1206.
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possibility of valid R.S. 2477 rights-of-way, OHV travel was
prohibited “subject to valid existing rights.”17
Kane County officials—believing they had valid R.S. 2477 rightsof-way in parts of Grand Staircase-Escalante—removed thirty-one
Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) road signs that prohibited
OHV travel.18 Kane County officials also erected new signs, many of
which permitted OHV travel on the disputed roads.19 Then, on
August 22, 2005, Kane County passed an ordinance (the “2005
Ordinance”) “to regulate OHV use on county . . . roads.”20
Two environmental groups—the Wilderness Society and
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance—challenged the 2005 Ordinance
and sought an injunction prohibiting Kane County from opening
roads on federal public lands to OHVs.21 Kane County moved to
dismiss, “arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a
claim, and failure to join necessary and indispensable parties (the
State of Utah and the United States).”22 The district court rejected
Kane County’s arguments and stated that it “need not make any
final determination regarding the existence of any R.S. 2477 rightof-way in order to grant [the environmental groups’] requested
relief.”23
Kane County then filed a motion to alter the district court’s
order and sought permission to prove that the county possessed valid
R.S. 2477 rights-of-way.24 The district court denied this motion.25
On December 11, 2006, Kane County rescinded the 2005
Ordinance.26 County officials removed some of the county road signs
and removed all decals permitting OHV use from the remaining
road signs.27 The district court held that Kane County failed to show
that it was absolutely clear the county would not engage in similar
conduct once the case was dismissed.28 The district court granted
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1206–07.
Id. at 1207.
Id.
Id.
Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane County, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1306 (D. Utah 2006).
Wilderness Soc’y, 581 F.3d at 1207.
Id.
Id. at 1208.
Id.
Id.
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summary judgment for the environmental plaintiffs, holding that
Kane County’s actions were preempted by the federal management
plan.29 The court further held that unadjudicated R.S. 2477 rights
could not defeat a preemption claim.30 The district court ordered
Kane County to take down all “‘County road signs that conflict with
federal land management plans . . .’ and enjoined the County from .
. . open[ing] any route closed . . . by governing federal law ‘unless
and until Kane County proves in a court of law that it possesses a
right-of-way to any such route.’”31 Kane County filed a timely
appeal.
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
There are several significant issues in Wilderness Society, but one
of the most dominant is the question of what is required to establish
a valid pre-1976 R.S. 2477 right-of-way. Prior to 1976,32 the
establishment of a valid R.S. 2477 right-of-way “required no
administrative formalities: no entry, no application, no license, no
patent, and no deed on the federal side; no formal act of public
acceptance on the part of the states or localities in whom the right
was vested.”33 In fact, before 1976 there was little reason to “raise or
resolve potential R.S. 2477 issues” because anyone could travel
across public lands and establish a valid right-of-way.34 But, in 1976
the federal government changed its management policy from a “prodevelopment lands policy” to a “retention and conservation”
policy.35 To this day, courts are struggling to determine what is
required to prove the establishment of pre-1976 R.S. 2477 right.
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM (“SUWA”)36
addressed a portion of this question. In SUWA, employees from
three counties entered federal public lands—without notifying the
BLM—and graded sixteen roads.37 A dispute arose between the

29. Id. at 1209.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 702, 90
Stat. 2743, 2787 (1976).
33. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735, 741 (10th Cir. 2005).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 425 F.3d 735.
37. Id. at 742.
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counties and the BLM about whether the counties possessed valid
R.S. 2477 rights. Relying on a BLM administrative decision, the
district court held that the counties did not possess valid R.S. 2477
claims.38 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the BLM lacks
primary jurisdiction over R.S. 2477 rights-of-way,39 and remanded,
instructing the district court to determine the validity of the
counties’ R.S. 2477 claims.40
But, understanding that district courts may need to resolve
thousands of R.S. 2477 claims after the SUWA decision, the Tenth
Circuit provided some guidance on resolving future R.S. 2477
claims. First, SUWA held that “the burden of proof lies on those
parties ‘seeking to enforce rights-of-way against the federal
government.’”41 Second, SUWA held that the establishment of a
valid right-of-way requires: (1) “the landowner’s objectively
manifested intent to dedicate property to the public use as a right of
way”; and (2) “acceptance by the public.”42 In Utah, to objectively
manifest intent to dedicate requires any act sufficient to manifest
intent.43 This does not require any notice, filing, or other affirmative
action.44 And, acceptance by the public simply requires continuous
public use for ten years.45
Wilderness Society distinguished R.S. 2477 claims, which do not
require an affirmative action, from mining claims, which do require
affirmative action. In comparing mining claims, the court stated:

38. Id. at 743–44.
39. The court reasoned that the BLM lacks primary jurisdiction over R.S. 2477 rightsof-way because, “[i]n sum, nothing in the terms of R.S. 2477 gives the BLM authority to
make binding determinations on the validity of the rights of way granted thereunder . . . .” Id.
at 757. The court further stated,
This decision is reinforced by the long history of practice under the statute, during
which the BLM has consistently disclaimed authority to make binding decisions on
R.S. 2477 rights of way. Indeed, there have been 139 years of practice under the
statute . . . and the BLM has not pointed to a single case in which a court has
deferred to a binding determination by the BLM on an R.S. 2477 right of way.
Id.
40. Id. at 758.
41. Id. at 768 (quoting S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1130,
1136 (D. Utah 2001)).
42. Id. at 769.
43. Id. at 754.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 771.
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Congress established a very different system for R.S. 2477 rights of
way. Because there are no patents, title to rights of way passes
independently of any action or approval on the part of the BLM.
All that is required . . . are acts on the part of the grantee sufficient
to manifest an intent to accept the congressional offer. In fact,
because there were no notice or filing requirements of any kind,
R.S. 2477 rights of way may have been established—and legal title
may have passed—without the BLM ever being aware of it. Thus,
R.S. 2477 creates no executive role for the BLM to play.46

Thus, the SUWA court explained that counties were/are under
no obligation to file or record valid R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. This
language is crucial to the Wilderness Society decision.
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
On appeal, Kane County argued five issues: (1) the
“environmental plaintiffs lacked standing”;47 (2) the rescission of the
2005 Ordinance mooted the case;48 (3) the environmental plaintiffs
lacked a cause of action;49 (4) the State of Utah and the United
States are “necessary and indispensable parties”;50 and (5) the district
court erred when it held that alleged R.S. 2477 rights were
preempted by a federal management plan under the Supremacy
Clause.51 The majority disagreed with Kane County on each issue
and affirmed the district court’s decision.
A. Standing
Kane County’s first challenge on appeal was that the
environmental plaintiffs lacked standing.52 “Constitutional standing
requires (1) an injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability.”53
To meet the injury in fact requirement, “a plaintiff must show an
‘invasion of a legally protected interest,’ which is ‘(a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

72

Id. at 754.
Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane County, 581 F.3d 1198, 1205 (10th Cir. 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1219–20.
Id. at 1205.
Id. at 1209.
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hypothetical.’”54 To meet the causation requirement, the injury must
be traceable to the challenged action of the defendant.55 Finally, to
meet the redressability requirement, it must be likely that the injury
will be corrected by a favorable decision.56
The Wilderness Society majority held that the environmental
plaintiffs established “injury in fact” when they submitted affidavits
from individual members describing how their recreational use of the
public lands was disturbed by OHV use.57 Moreover, the court held
that there is a substantial likelihood that removing and changing
road signs that prohibited OHV use would increase OHV use and
subsequently harm the recreational interest of the environmental
plaintiffs.58 Finally, the court held that an order declaring Kane
County’s actions unconstitutional and issuing an injunction would
likely correct the alleged injury.59 Thus, the majority held that the
individual members of the two environmental plaintiffs’ groups had
standing to pursue their preemption claims.60
B. Mootness
Next, Kane County argued that the plaintiffs’ claims were
moot.61 In order to overcome a mootness defense, there must be an
actual controversy at all stages of the case, not just at the time the
complaint is filed.62 In Wilderness Society, Kane County rescinded the
2005 Ordinance that opened certain roads on public lands to OHV
use.63 Despite the rescission, however, Wilderness Society held that
“Kane County rescinded the Ordinance in a deliberate attempt to
render the pending litigation moot, and it seems poised to reenact a

54. Id. at 1209–10 (quoting Stewart v. Kempthorne, 554 F.3d 1245, 1253 (10th Cir.
2009)).
55. Id. at 1210 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc. 528 U.S.
167, 180 (2000)).
56. Id. (citing Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181).
57. Id. at 1210–13.
58. Id. at 1213.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1214.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1208.
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similar ordinance.”64 As a result, the court held that the issue was
neither constitutionally nor prudentially moot.65
C. Cause of Action and Prudential Standing
Kane County’s third challenge was that the environmental
plaintiffs lacked a cause of action and prudential standing.66 Kane
County argued that the Supremacy Clause does not provide a private
right cause of action.67 Further, Kane County alleged that the
plaintiffs did not have prudential standing because “(1) they . . .
assert[ed] the legal rights of the United States; (2) their claims
raise[d] generalized grievances; and (3) their claims [fell] outside the
zone of interest protected by the Supremacy Clause.”68
The Wilderness Society court rejected all three claims.69 First, the
court held that the plaintiffs relied on their own injuries, not any
harm to the United States.70 Next, the court held that the injuries
the plaintiffs alleged in the submitted affidavits were specific rather
than general.71 Finally, the court held that “[t]he Supremacy Clause
is at least arguably designed to protect individuals harmed by the
application of preempted enactments.”72
D. Necessary and Indispensable Parties
Kane County’s fourth claim on appeal was that the
environmental plaintiffs failed to add the State of Utah and the
United States to the action as necessary and indispensable parties.73
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 has two steps: (1) necessity, and
(2) indispensability.74 “Only necessary parties can be indispensable
parties.”75 The Wilderness Society majority was able to avoid this
question by expressly declaring that its decision—like that of the
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

74

Id. at 1215.
Id.
Id. at 1215–16.
Id. at 1216.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1217.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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district court—was not based on the validity of any alleged R.S.
2477 rights.76 Therefore, the court ultimately held that the State of
Utah and the United States were not necessary parties because the
court was deciding the merits of the case without determining the
validity of any R.S. 2477 rights.77
E. The Merits: Preemption
After the Wilderness Society court worked its way through Kane
County’s four initial claims on appeal, the court was finally able to
reach the merits of the case.78 Specifically, the court asked, “[I]s
county regulation of alleged but unproven R.S. 2477 rights
preempted when the local regulation conflicts with the federal, or are
counties free to regulate such routes prior to adjudication?”79
Kane County’s defense to the preemption claim was that it held
valid R.S. 2477 rights and therefore it could not be preempted.80
Yet, the court held that “Kane County [could not] defend a
preemption suit by simply alleging the existence of R.S. 2477 rights
of way; it must prove those rights in a court of law.”81 The majority
recognized that in SUWA it held that “the establishment of R.S.
2477 rights of way required no administrative formalities: no entry,
no application, no license, no patent, and no deed on the federal
side; no formal act of public acceptance on the part of the states or
localities in whom the right was vested,” but reasoned that the
creation of R.S. 2477 rights was not an issue in this case.82 Instead,
the court held that Kane County’s “claimed rights may well have
been created and vested decades ago, but until it proves up those
rights, we agree with the district court that its regulations on federal
lands that otherwise conflict with federal law are preempted.”83
Thus, the Wilderness Society court affirmatively required Kane
County to adjudicate to establish its rights before it could use its
rights as a defense, while in the same breath recognized that R.S.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1218.
Id. at 1218–19.
Id. at 1219.
Id.
Id. at 1220–21.
Id. at 1221.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
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2477 did not require any formalities to establish these rights.84 This
inconsistency is troublesome; however, the majority had to overcome
some major procedural hurdles before it even reached the substance
of this obstacle. This Note posits that, while the majority may have
been sympathetic to the environmental plaintiffs, the plaintiffs lacked
standing and a cause of action, and therefore the plaintiffs’ suit
should have been dismissed. Further, even if standing and a valid
cause of action is assumed, the majority failed to properly recognize
Kane County’s R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in public lands.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Wilderness Society majority failed to recognize Kane
County’s vested rights in R.S. 2477 roads and, in so doing, erred
when it held that any county ordinance allowing OHVs in
contradiction to a federal management plan is preempted under the
Supremacy Clause. The district court denied Kane County’s claim
that it had valid existing R.S. 2477 rights without even considering
evidence regarding the existence of R.S. 2477 rights.85 “Why?
‘[B]ecause the County has yet to establish the validity of those rights
in a court of law.’”86 The Wilderness Society court accepted this
circular reasoning. Essentially, the majority’s holding means that
Kane County has no valid rights under R.S. 2477 unless it obtains a
legal judgment from a court of law.87 This holding is expressly
contradictory to the language in SUWA, which states that “the
establishment of R.S. 2477 rights of way required no administrative
formalities . . . no formal act of public acceptance on the part of the
states or localities in whom the right was vested.”88
However, the holding of Wilderness Society has deeper effects.
Specifically, if Kane County does not possess valid R.S. 2477 rights
unless it obtains a court judgment, then all of the county’s road
management constitutes illegal trespass.89 This is detrimental to
“federal as well as local interests.”90 Improvements on public lands

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

76

Id.
Id. at 1228 (McConnell, J., dissenting).
Id. (citation omitted).
See id.
S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735, 741 (10th Cir. 2005).
Wilderness Soc’y, 581 F.3d at 1229 (McConnell, J., dissenting).
Id.
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will constitute illegal activity and, as a result, Kane County rights are
removed, the United States loses the benefit of these improvements,
and transportation across public lands is hampered. This detrimental
holding occurred only after the Wilderness Society court got through
several procedural hurdles, many of which have significant impacts
on future cases.
A. Standing
The Wilderness Society majority erred when it held that the
environmental plaintiffs had standing to bring a suit against Kane
County. In order to have standing, “the plaintiff must have suffered
an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not
conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”91 In its opinion, the majority spent a
lot of time discussing the concreteness and actuality of the
environmental plaintiffs’ injury, without discussing “whether the
injury is to a ‘legally protected interest.’”92 In fact, the plaintiffs do
not point to a single law that gives them a legally protected interest
in this case.93
The majority relied on a string of cases that all arose under the
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) and other statutes that
provided parties with a statutory right to challenge agency actions
that harmed aesthetic interests.94 Wilderness Society did not arise
under the APA or any other statute providing rights to challenge
actions based on aesthetic preservation.95 Thus, the cases used by the
majority do little to establish that the environmental plaintiffs had
standing based on a legally protected interest. Further, the majority
relied on San Juan County v. United States96 to establish that the
environmental plaintiffs had standing. San Juan stated that,
“SUWA’s environmental concern is a legally protectable interest.”97
But this language comes from the portion of the case discussion
about whether SUWA was able to intervene in a lawsuit where other
91. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 1210–11 (majority opinion); see also id. at 1229–30 (McConnell, J.,
dissenting).
95. Id. at 1230 (McConnell, J., dissenting).
96. 503 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
97. Id. at 1199.
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parties already had standing.98 “Standing and intervention present
two different questions.”99
Finally, any interest the environmental plaintiffs may have in the
enjoyment of Grand Staircase-Escalante, derives from the United
States’ ownership of the land.100 Thus, the plaintiffs’ must meet the
standards of third-party standing, rather than meeting the
requirements of regular standing merely requiring an injury in fact.101
Third-party standing requires that when a plaintiff brings a claim the
plaintiff must show “a close relationship to the third party.”102 There
is no evidence in the opinion to suggest that the environmental
plaintiffs had a close relationship with the United States in order to
bring a suit as a third-party plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiffs lack
regular standing, and they also lack the heightened third-party
standing, which is more applicable in this case.103
B. Cause of Action
The environmental plaintiffs in Wilderness Society pointed to no
statute giving them a cause of action. Instead, the plaintiffs relied
“on the Supremacy Clause and the astounding idea that any time a
state action arguably conflicts with a federal law, a cause of action
exists.”104 In other words, “[i]f ‘preemption’ were a sufficient basis
for a cause of action, then every federal statute would implicitly
authorize a private cause of action against a state or local
government defendant.”105 Therefore, the environmental plaintiffs

98. Wilderness Soc’y, 581 F.3d at 1230–31 (McConnell, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 1230.
100. Id. at 1231–32.
101. Id. at 1232.
102. Id. (citation omitted).
103. Judge McConnell introduces the following analogy to provide guidance:
Imagine that my next-door neighbor, who keeps his property neat and tidy, is faced
with a competing claimant to the land, who is likely to allow the property to fill with
weeds. I might very much hope my neighbor wins. My property values and aesthetic
interests could seriously be affected. I may be impatient with my neighbor's
inclination toward compromise and apparent disinclination to go to court. But no
one would say I have standing to sue in defense of my neighbor's property rights.
The Wilderness Society is in precisely that situation.
Id.
104. Id. at 1233.
105. Id.
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did not assert a legal cause of action to bring their claims against
Kane County.
C. The Merits: Preemption
In his dissent, Judge McConnell argues three reasons why the
Kane County 2005 Ordinance is not preempted by federal law.106
This Note argues that two of these reasons provide the strongest
support against the majority’s preemption holding. First, the BLM’s
management plan does not preempt Kane County’s 2005 Ordinance
because the management plan was “subject to valid existing
rights.”107 And second, even if there is a conflict between the federal
management plan and the 2005 Ordinance, preemption cannot be
determined until the court reaches a conclusion on Kane County’s
potential R.S. 2477 rights-of-way.108
First, it is difficult to reach the conclusion that the BLM’s
management plan preempted Kane County’s 2005 Ordinance
because the management plan contains a non-preemption clause.
The BLM plan expressly states that it is “subject to valid existing
rights.” This phrase was likely included to address unknown R.S.
2477 claims. In fact, this non-preemption clause may be an
admission by the BLM that it had no idea how many valid R.S. 2477
rights-of-way existed at the time the plan was set in motion.109
Accordingly, it is difficult to make the jump from the nonpreemption clause to a holding that Kane County’s 2005 Ordinance
was preempted by the BLM plan. As a result, the majority erred
when it held that federal law preempted Kane County’s actions.
Second, even if there is a conflict between the BLM plan and
Kane County’s 2005 Ordinance, there is no reason why the county’s

106. (1) “Federal regulations are expressly subject to ‘valid existing rights,’ thus
precluding preemption.” Id. at 1235. (2) “Even apart from the reservation of “valid existing
rights,” the county ordinance and BLM regulations can coexist.” Id. at 1237. (3) “Even if
there were a conflict between county law and federal law, we cannot determine which prevails
without adjudicating the county’s claimed rights-of-way.” Id. at 1239.
107. See id. at 1235 (quoting identical language from “Congress (in FLPMA), the
President (in the Executive Order creating the Monument), and the BLM (in the Monument
Plan)” (citing S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735, 760 (10th Cir. 2005))).
108. See id. at 1239.
109. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 425 F.3d at 754 (“In fact, because there were no
notice or filing requirements of any kind, R.S. 2477 rights of way may have been established—
and legal title may have passed—without the BLM ever being aware of it. Thus, R.S. 2477
creates no executive role for the BLM to play.”).
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claims are automatically preempted without a decision on whether
the county possessed valid R.S. 2477 rights. Kane County attempted
to prove its R.S. 2477 rights in district court, but was denied an
opportunity to do so.110 “To say that the County’s claims are
preempted until they are proven is to presume, without proof, that
none are valid.”111
IV. CONCLUSION
The Wilderness Society majority erred for several reasons. First,
the environmental plaintiffs lacked standing because they held no
legally protected interest. Second, the environmental plaintiffs did
not have a valid cause of action. The Supremacy Clause does not
provide a private right of action anytime federal law and state law
conflict. Otherwise, this would provide standing to an expansive
group that has never enjoyed Article III standing. Finally, the
majority erred in holding that federal law preempted Kane County’s
actions because the federal law contained a non-preemption clause
and the court failed to address the validity of Kane County’s alleged
R.S. 2477 rights. The Wilderness Society decision, therefore, adds
confusion and inconsistency to an already difficult area of law.
Douglas P. Farr

110. Wilderness Soc’y, 581 F.3d at 1239 (McConnell, J., dissenting).
111. Id.
 J.D. candidate, April 2010, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. I would like to thank my wife for all of her love and support.
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